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I. Introduction 
 Relations between NATO and Russia are strained or hostile in nearly every 
geopolitical region, but that conflict does not extend into the Arctic where Russia has 
actually been a leading voice for cooperation despite speculation that conflict in the 
region is likely. The Arctic, located between North America and the Soviet Union, was a 
highly strategic region and hotbed of submarine activity in the Cold War. The Soviet 
North Fleet patrolled the Atlantic from its base in the Arctic, and its nuclear submarines 
granted nuclear second-strike ability. NATO had bases in Greenland and Iceland that 
were intended to pin in the Soviets and to protect North Atlantic sea lanes, and NATO 
nuclear warheads launched from the Barents or White Sea could strike Moscow and St. 
Petersburg within minutes.    1
 As the Cold War ended, the Arctic became a unique region detached from global 
politics and characterized primarily by peaceful coexistence and economic and scientific 
cooperation. The end of the NATO-Soviet regional standoff in the Arctic after the Cold 
War led to a relative decline in the geopolitical relevance of the Arctic. The Russian 
North Fleet, starved of funding, fell to decay, and the U.S. stopped investing in 
icebreakers and started to close Northern military bases.   Arctic states including Russia, 2
the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway pursued various regional 
governance structures, adhering to the United Nations Convention for the Law of the 
Seas and developing the Arctic Council, a consensus-based, non-binding, high-level 
forum for regional cooperation.  
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 The impact of climate change on the Arctic altered popular perceptions of the 
political state of the High North.   While the effects of climate change may not be 3
noticeable in many areas around the world, they have had an outsized effect in the 
Arctic. The High North is melting at an accelerated pace and is expected to be ice-free 
over summers in the future, and the Arctic Ocean’s opening may impact global 
commerce, security, and politics, drawing attention from global policymakers.   Though 4
detrimental to indigenous people living traditional lifestyles in the region, the warming 
has allowed a variety of economic opportunities to emerge. Rare earth minerals and 
trillions of dollars worth of other minerals ranging from iron to diamonds have been 
discovered.   A fifth of the world’s total remaining undiscovered petroleum reserves–a 5
truly massive quantity are also believed to be located in the High North.   In addition, two 6
of the world’s most bountiful fisheries—those in the Barents and Beaufort Seas—may 
expand as waters warm, and the opening of new Arctic shipping shortcuts much faster 
than traditional trade routes have also been heralded.   The emergence of economic 7
opportunities and increased accessibility of the region have led to the return of the 
traditionally peripheral Arctic to being a geostrategically important region. With the 
increased activity in the region, an alarmist view of Arctic affairs became popularized in 
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the press, and the media was full of warnings of “a New Cold War” between NATO and 
Russia.   8
 The predicted conflict has not occurred, and the nations around the Arctic Ocean
—Russia and four NATO states—have actually made great efforts to cement regional 
norms of cooperation and peaceful coexistence.   With some small exceptions, the 9
cooperative paradigm of the High North has remained robust despite a sharp downturn 
in NATO-Russia relations in other areas of the world such as Ukraine, and this raises an 
important question: why is Russia cooperating with the West in the Arctic while it is 
competing with the West in most other arenas? The Arctic is a region in which Russia is 
the preeminent power and has a clear advantage over its neighbors in that it exceeds its 
neighbors in regional population and economic development, has the largest 
circumpolar landmass, controls the majority of the region’s resources, and has the best 
access to the Arctic Ocean by means of the largest icebreaker fleet in the world. Given 
its strong position, Russia has the ability to disrupt the affairs of its Arctic neighbors. 
With the West, including its Arctic neighbors, applying pressure to Russia in other 
regions, why would Russia not use its leverage in the North to retaliate against the 
attempt of the West to financially and socially isolate it? T 
 In this paper, I will examine the factors and mechanisms that are leading to 
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   With the exception of Russia, all of the Arctic littoral states—Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Cana9 -
da, and the United States—belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Russia’s remarkably cooperative behavior in the region. I will demonstrate that the 
region has remained extraordinarily cooperative even through the Crimea Crisis, and I 
argue that Russia has made an effort to maintain the Arctic as a ‘zone of cooperation’ 
where extraregional political dynamics have little effect. Then, I will attempt to show that 
this effort is not out of commitment to international institution building but out of its own 
national interests. Soviet-era sources of oil and gas in sub-Arctic Russia which have 
fueled the Russian economy for decades will soon begin to decline, so Russia is being 
forced to look North for a new source of essential energy resources. Russian firms do 
not possess the necessary technical ability to extract these resources, so they are 
reliant on Western energy firms to provide the necessary technology. Russia is 
cooperating in the Arctic despite conflicts with NATO in other theaters as it is a crucial 
Russian national interest to develop the High North.  
II. Literature Review 
 After the end of the Cold War, the Arctic declined in importance and became an 
area of little geopolitical significance. It wasn't until the late 2000s and early 2010s that 
political interest in the region became significant and the academic mainstream began 
to seriously examine the region. Since 2014, there has been a dramatic upsurge in 
literature on the Arctic, but given the rapidly changing politics of the region, the literature 
often lags behind events. As such, the academic literature on Arctic geopolitics is 
relatively small and limited to a select few authors who usually focus on individual 
country policies or events rather than on large trends. 
 There are relatively few experts who focus solely on the region, and those few 
scholars who focus on the region such as Laruelle, Byers, Staun, and Hønneland 
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provide either nuanced understandings of certain topics or very broad understandings of 
the region and its implications to the world.   Staun’s work comes closest to this thesis 10
in its analysis of Russian foreign policy, but it focuses on Russia’s general priorities and 
strategy at large. Staun touches very briefly on the fact that Russia is forced to partner 
with Western firms for technological reasons, but he does not expand on it. Staun does 
not examine this briefly mentioned fact from an international relations standpoint, and 
this thesis will expand on economic cooperation’s importance to the politics of the High 
North.   11
 Of the literature on the place of the Arctic in global politics that does exist, a 
prominent idea is of Arctic Exceptionalism—that the Arctic has come to be understood 
as an exceptional region of cooperation relatively undisturbed by global political 
dynamics. In On Arctic Exceptionalism, Juha Käplyä and Harri Mikkola of the Finnish 
Institute of International Relations examine the history and challenges to that idea. They 
trace the emergence of political exceptionalism in the Arctic and examine challenges to 
this paradigm. Focusing partially on the impacts of the Crimea Crisis, they argue that 
Arctic Exceptionalism represents a limited approach to the region and that regional 
cooperation has been impacted by extra-Arctic political affairs. To a certain extent, the 
region was indeed impacted, but the paper was written in 2015 and no longer reflects 
the political state of the High North. Following 2015, the Arctic quickly returned to a 
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cooperative state and Crimea Crisis-driven tensions were shut out by intentional efforts 
by all parties. While they argue that the Ukraine conflict shows the limits of Arctic 
Exceptionalism, I disagree and explore this claim in the section on Crimea, sanctions, 
and oil prices. The Ukraine conflict did initially leak into the Arctic, but this tension 
quickly dissipated from the region and can be taken as evidence that the region is 
indeed largely insulated from global political dynamics. 
 Käplyä and Mikkola assert that Arctic Exceptionalism is based on assumptions that 
“there is not that much to fight over,” “that the Arctic area has existing governance 
structures that foster co-operation and can defuse potential conflict dynamics,” and 
“Arctic states have explicitly expressed their interest in international cooperation.”   I 12
find these assumptions insufficient in explaining the political dynamics of the High North 
in light of the downturn in West-Russia relations over Russia’s involvement in the 
Crimea Crisis and the Syrian Civil War. The assumptions outlined are not self-sustaining 
in that they reflect a single moment but do not reflect a trend. The argument that there is 
little to fight over at that moment does not provide a satisfactory explanation for future 
trends as governance structures may not be able to defuse conflict dynamics. For 
instance, the Arctic Council forbids discussion of security affairs, leaving no robust 
institution in which to focus on militarization.   That Arctic states have expressed interest 13
in cooperation is a reflection of current affairs and in no way requires that those states 
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continue cooperative behavior into the future, and Käpylä and Mikkola’s explanation 
fails to provide sound reasons for which the region should continue to be insulated from 
extra regional politics. 
 Given that the literature on the Arctic is so small, examinations of Russian foreign 
policy from the standpoint of international relations theory as well as of domestic 
Russian policy formation can be useful in understanding Russian policy creation at the 
Arctic level. Understanding Russian foreign policy from a theoretical perspective and 
understanding Russia’s national foreign policy can be highly useful in understanding its 
motives in the Arctic. A dominant theory of many leading academics is that Russian 
foreign policy in the Putin Era is geared primarily towards returning Russia to 
Derzhavnost, or great power status.    Within this theory, there are a two often proposed 14
sub-objectives common to most speculation. Though the terminology differs, commonly-
stated objectives consist of “prestige-building” and “economic development” and are 
pursued as part of the larger goal of returning Russia to Derzhavnost. Understanding of 
this Russian goal is essential to understanding the motives by which Russian Arctic 
policy is created.  
Prestige-building 
 Oliker et al. of the Research and Development Corporation (RAND Corp) provide a 
particularly excellent overview of Russia’s “prestige-building” objective. The think tank 
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created an extensive report for American policymakers in which it examines the variety 
of historical, internal, and external factors affecting Russian domestic and foreign policy. 
RAND postulates that Russian foreign policy will support goals to create a Russia that is 
strong politically and militarily while being economically prosperous, technologically 
advanced, influential culturally, and capable of asserting moral authority. The pursuit of 
these goals reflects a push to halt or reverse Russia's decline following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and a view that Russia should be one of the poles of power in a 
multipolar world order. Though prestige and status may be increasingly and broadly 
seen by Russian policymakers to include things such as diplomatic stature, soft power, 
and moral authority, prestige is often linked to military strength and dominant behavior.   15
  Forsberg et al. examine other theoretical explanations of Russian prestige-
seeking behavior using a social psychology framework. While they admit that the 
importance Russia places on status may be a sign of the struggle for security in an 
anarchic international order, they say one can make a complex constructivist argument 
that Russia's prestige-seeking is actually related to the historical Russian identity and 
domestic politics.   Per constructivism, states are social constructs and reflect the wills 16
and desires of the people that constitute them, so national interests and foreign policy 
objectives are reflections of the interests of those individuals who the state represents—
be they politically powerful oligarchs, political elites, the general electorate, or the 
security apparatus.  
 10
!  Oliker, Olga, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine Yusupov. Russian Foreign Poli15 -
cy: Sources and Implications. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 2009, 89.
   Forsberg, Tuomas. “Status and Emotions in Russian Foreign Policy." Communist and Post-16
Communist Studies 47, no. 3-4 (September 2014): 251-78. doi:10.1016/0967-067x(93)90007-e, 
264
 Olga Milanova argues that Russian identity formation since the 18th century has 
included resentment against the West due to a feeling of Russian inferiority or 
“otherness,” and an identity caught between Asia and Europe.   Tying into this, 17
Forsberg et al. point out Richard Sakwa's historical “Russia Problem” in which status-
seeking is not about security but about receiving the status and respect from the West 
that it thinks it deserves.   Indeed, Russia's turning away from the West is often 18
attributed to Western powers' lack of genuine recognition of Russian status and 
equality.   Forsberg et al. acknowledge that states do not have feelings, but they also 19
point out that the individuals who identify with a state (be they the wealthy elite or the 
general electorate) can indeed have emotional reactions. In addition having emotional 
reactions, the state's representatives have an extra impetus to act in reflection to 
emotion as their reaction will affect their legitimacy and popularity at home.    20
 Beyond emotion, Forsberg et al. also state that status can be a useful tool. They 
theorize that being accepted as a great power not only implies eliteness but also 
indicates expectations of superior regional issue management and dominant behavior 
towards smaller states. Social rank implies greater access to socially allocated assets, 
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and some pursue status for self-esteem rather than for material reasons. Prevailing in a 
conflict can enhance a state's influence and set a precedent that could entrench 
expectations of deferential behavior, and it could also derive material benefits, and 
these benefits to status play into an additional theoretical interpretation of status-
seeking.    21
 Building prestige is one of the three basic foreign policy approaches that famed 
political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau outlines as part of his concept of political realism. 
He describes realism as a demonstration of the power a nation either has or believes it 
has, and it is important to demonstrate power so that a state can pursue other short- or 
long-term goals. This demonstration of power allows a state to push for its interests 
more than a less prestigious state might be able to do.   22
Economic Development 
 Another dominant theme in scholarly work on Russian foreign policy is the 
importance of economic development, and this thesis serves to highlight the mechanism 
through which economic growth is pursued at a regional level. In addition to seeking to 
build prestige, Russia also desires continued robust economic development in its 
pursuit of derzhavnost. According to both Staun and RAND, it was strong economic 
growth in the early Putin years that allowed Russia to begin to implement more active 
and assertive foreign policy, and Russia is likely very sentient of this fact and seeks to 
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continue robust growth as a result.    23
 Conventional wisdom attributes Russia's economic development to its vast 
energy resources and the high market price for oil and gas, but RAND sees this view as 
simplistic and inaccurate. In its report, RAND minimizes the impact of oil and gas on the 
economy and instead states that a growing middle class, a rapid growth in the service 
sector, and large increases in trade and foreign direct investment were the main drivers 
of Russian economic growth. Oil and gas exports explain half of the difference between 
trend growth of 4.6 percent and the actual average of 6.7 percent between 1998 and 
2007.   RAND does not entirely discount the importance of energy exports to Russian 24
foreign policy though, stating that some policy decisions are indeed led by Russian 
support for its strategic energy industry. Examples of these decisions include Russian 
government pressure on Western firms to relinquish or modify contracts that grant them 
permission to develop large Russian gas reserves, supporting state-owned Gazprom's 
acquiring of downstream assets, and moves to ensure that Gazprom controls all gas 
leaving the countries of the former Soviet Union. That said, the investment strategies of 
Gazprom and other state-owned Russian corporations suggest that they are acting in 
their own economic interests rather than for the government or at the behest of Russia’s 
political elite.    25
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 Staun argues otherwise, stating that Russia has benefited from growing energy 
export revenues from high gas and oil prices, rising exports in precious metals, and a 
swelling nuclear sector. In 2006, petroleum exports accounted for almost 65 percent of 
Russia's exports despite calls for diversification.   In regard to foreign policy, the 26
importance of economic development is intricately linked to the development of the 
Russian energy sector by most every scholar examining the region.   27
 While Russian behavior in the Arctic has been superficially assertive and 
bombastic, Russia has simultaneously joined other Arctic states in enshrining a 
circumpolar norm of cooperation. Whenever discussing the region in an international 
forum, Russian government spokespeople have almost unfailingly referred to the need 
for international cooperation in the North.   This behavior is ostensibly contrasted with 28
Russian foreign policy in other global arenas, raising the question as to why Russia is 
breaking with its usual practices in the High North.  
Prestige-seeking vs. Economic development as Russian priorities 
 With this understanding of Russian foreign policy objectives—economic 
development and prestige-seeking—the confusion over Russia’s Arctic behavior comes 
down to reconciling the priority placed on each objective in the region. Should Russia 
pursue prestige-building in the Arctic at the potential cost of economic development as it 
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has in the cases of Ukraine and Syria (with resulting economic sanctions), or should it 
prioritize economic development? Russia could act more aggressively in the Arctic and 
potentially dominant regional affairs thus raising its global profile, but this may 
jeopardize its ability to develop the High North if it were to result in additional sanctions. 
Prestige-building and economic development do not necessarily have to be competing 
goals. Staun briefly explores the balancing of these two objectives in the Arctic in a 
report for the Royal Danish Defense College. He hypothesizes that Russia has two 
political tracks in the Arctic—one to to prioritize “Russia’s greatness” in the Arctic and 
another to optimize Russian economic output.   29
 While the literature points toward economic interests being of primary concern in 
the Arctic, economy-oriented foreign policy does not necessarily mean that Russia has 
to act in a peaceful manner, especially when it has major economic interests in disputed 
areas. While a desire for stability in the region may promote foreign direct investment 
and thus promote economic goals, it is important to understand that Russia is indeed 
competing economically with other Arctic states for investment and commerce.  It 
should also be noted that pursuing prestige-building measures and economic 
development are not mutually exclusive goals, but confrontational prestige-building 
measures may lead to difficulties in economic pursuits. As such, I argue that there must 
be a more cooperative economic mechanism for maintaining stability, and a compelling 
argument is that this mechanism is technological and economic partnership coupled 
with a crucial Russian economic need to develop the High North.  
 With declining energy resources in traditional non-Arctic fields and a lack of 
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domestic capability to adequately build energy extracting infrastructure in the Far North, 
Russia has had to rely on technology transfers from major Western energy companies 
to continue to invest in its future.   Given that such transfers are highly susceptible to 30
being halted by the West, it is in Russia's economic interests to maintain the Arctic as a 
region free from external political dynamics in an attempt to keep its poor relationship 
with the West elsewhere from impacting its affairs in the High North. That Russia seeks 
to cooperate with the West in the Arctic so as to be able to develop the Arctic will be the 
crux of this thesis’ argument and help to explain Russia’s prioritization of economic 
desires over prestige-building efforts—the inverse of Russia’s recent prioritization of 
foreign policy goals in Ukraine and Syria. 
III. The Need for Arctic Oil and Gas 
 Russia’s relations with the West have taken a sharply negative turn in most every 
global arena, but the Arctic continues to be a realm primarily characterized by 
cooperation in part due to Russian efforts. Why is this? I theorize that it is because the 
country is committed to peaceful development of the region out of its own national 
interests. Its profound need for economic cooperation with the West—particularly in the 
energy sector—is the primary cause of Russia’s continued support of Arctic 
Exceptionalism. While petroleum resources were widely expected by the media to 




The graph from Campbell’s Atlas of Oil and Gas Depletion (page 149) illustrates Russia’s quickly 
declining conventional oil and gas resources without the use of Arctic energy resources. 
 Russia has long been a leading producer of oil and natural gas, but production in 
its traditional major sources peaked in the 1980s according to the US Energy 
Information Administration.   In the time since this peak production, companies such as 31
Rosneft and Gazprom Neft have increased efficiency in older fields to boost production 
by utilizing technologies such as hydraulic fracturing. Further production gains will 
require substantial investment, leading both industry and policymakers to look north. 
Campbell’s Atlas of Oil and Gas Depletion is a leading source of knowledge on global 
energy depletion rates, and the Atlas has a large chapter on Russian energy. Campbell 
and Heapes note the importance of Arctic gas production to Russia, going so far as to 
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differentiate Russia’s resources into Arctic and sub-Arctic categories. After a peak in 
sub-Arctic production, production fell to half of 1991 levels by 2013, indicating a 
decrease in productivity from traditional energy reserves, and Arctic resources are rising 
to a dominant position. The atlas takes special note of the importance of the Arctic in 
maintaining Russian energy export quantities.   Even before the imposition of Western 32
sanctions over Russia’s annexation of the Crimea from Ukraine—the impact of which I 
will discuss later in this thesis—Russia was experiencing a production decline at its 
aging onshore oil fields and depended on East Siberian and Arctic offshore production 
to meet demands.  
 Russia needs Arctic energy resources to offset declines in conventional onshore 
production to maintain production of at least 10 million bpd beyond 2020.   Extraction of 33
petroleum resources is essential to the Russian economy, making up 64 percent of 
Russian exports and greatly supplementing the Russian annual budget. However, 
petroleum fields are quickly maturing.   As such, the energy resources contained in the 34
Arctic are crucial to Russia’s economic future, making the development of the region a 
priority for the Russian government. Industry insiders acknowledge that Russia’s 
traditional onshore oil and gas fields are depleting quickly. Mikå Mered of the Polarisk 
Group, an Arctic issues consultancy firm, stated “if you are the Russian government 
today and if you want to keep having your oil and gas, you need to start developing 
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offshore Arctic oil and gas fast.”   Alexey Kontorovich, the Research Manager of the 35
Institute of Geology, Oil and Gas at Russia’s Academy of Sciences, stated that the 
traditional sources of oil production will be declining or insufficient to meet national 
needs by the 2040s. According to Russia’s own Energy Strategy up to 2030, Arctic 
energy will help to stabilize national production as production in Western Siberia is 
expected to decline between 2015 and 2030.   Kontorovich stated that Arctic fields will 36
enable sustainable economic development for Russia during the entirety of the 21st 
century.   37
 Russia increasingly depends on production from remote sources such as 
offshore East Siberian and Arctic offshore fields to meet fiscal targets and balance its 
budget. It has been making significant efforts to develop the north, going so far as to 
begin to offer reduced tariffs and tax holidays for Russian energy firms to encourage 
investment in the Arctic according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.   Even 38
before Western sanctions targeted the Russian energy industry, state-owned Rosneft 
intended to invest $400 billion in Arctic offshore production over twenty years. That effort 
has been derailed by sanctions and the forced pull-out of technology partner 
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ExxonMobil, but the financial interest of the Russian state is well illustrated by this 
example.   39
IV. Technological Deficiency 
 While development of the Arctic is clearly crucial to both sustainable economic 
growth and Russia’s state coffers, there are notable technological difficulties in 
developing the region and Russian firms are technologically deficient in operating in the 
polar regions. Melting permafrost has both increased and decreased access to the 
Arctic by increasing the work year in the North while simultaneously making 
infrastructure development difficult due to the wet and shifting earth. In addition, the 
harsh climate damages equipment and makes safety difficult to ensure.   These on-40
shore problems are inconsequential in comparison to the difficulty in accessing most 
Arctic petroleum resources which are located offshore.   Even when Russian firms are 41
technically able to extract resources in the Arctic, making large-scale petroleum 
extraction economically feasible requires technical advancements in efficiency and 
productivity. Domestic Russian companies do not have the appropriate technological 
ability to be able to economically extract petroleum resources for export according to 
experts.   42
 Russian firms’ lack of technical capability to develop the High North has 
necessitated Russian joint development of polar energy resources with Western firms 
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such as ExxonMobil, Eni, Total, or Statoil to gain access to its future reserves of a 
resource that serves as the lifeblood of its economy. Western firms also stand to benefit 
from being technological partners with Russian firms by gaining access to new markets 
and reserves. Russian companies have sought to pair up with Western ones to acquire 
the necessary investment, expertise, equipment, and technology needed for extraction 
in the Arctic. Joint ventures have been encouraged by the Russian government which 
outlined a desire for increased petroleum cooperation in its 2010 Barents Sea 
demarcation agreement with Norway, close ties between Russian officials and Western 
petroleum company executives such as that between Putin and Total and ExxonMobil 
executives illustrate policymaker attempts to court Western energy firms.   Similarly, 43
industry expert Håkon Skretting has remarked that while Russia is a traditionally difficult 
market in which to operate, companies that provide technology can usually do so risk-
free.   44
 Norway, with its specialty in North Sea petroleum extraction, is considered a 
leading nation in offshore extraction technology, and the Russian government has 
courted Norwegian companies to operate in conjunction with Russian ones. For 
instance, Norwegian companies were awarded contracts in the Kara Sea before the 
Crimea Crisis. Rosneft's Prirazlomnaya oil rig, the first and only Arctic-class oil platform 
in the world, is 90 percent dependent on spare parts from Western companies, and a 
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quarter of its technology comes from Norwegian firms.   Norway's state-owned Statoil 45
has had several joint projects with Russia's state-owned Rosneft, and Statoil was 
considering bringing its floating liquified natural gas plant technology to Gazprom's 
Shtokman field in the Barents Sea before sanctions were levied on Russia. The 
preeminent development in the Russian Arctic is the Yamal Megaproject, a cluster of 
energy projects on the Yamal Peninsula belonging primarily to Gazprom and Rosneft. 
Most energy sources of the peninsula are not yet brought online as infrastructure is still 
being built, but limited export of energy has occurred. Other major joint projects include 
Shell-Gazprom Neft and Rosneft-ExxonMobil JV to develop heavy oil deposits and 
initiate hydraulic fracturing projects in the near-Arctic Bazhenov formation.   The most 46
technologically ambitious of those projects is a liquid natural gas plant on the Yamal 
Peninsula that relies on France's Total and Germany's Siemens for technology and 
equipment.   Russian firms lack the necessary expertise and industrial capability to 47
build turbines and other equipment, subsea extraction technology, liquid natural gas 
expertise, and other technologies, necessitating their cooperation with Western 
companies such as ExxonMobil, Eni, BP, Statoil, Siemens, Total, Shell, and 
ConocoPhillips amongst others.   48
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V. Arctic Exceptionalism  
 As the Arctic’s opening was being heralded, some experts and journalists warned 
that there was a potential for conflict over emerging resources in disputed areas, and 
others became alarmed by certain Russian actions in the Circumpolar North.   A 49
Russian explorer made an infamous claim to the North Pole seabed by planting a 
Russian flag on the seafloor in 2007, and Russian President Putin rejected a US-led, 
Western-dominated unipolar world order at the Munich Security Conference later that 
year.   Shortly after, Russia began aviation patrols across the Arctic and resumed North 50
Fleet activity in the Arctic.   While this led the media to take an alarmist tone, it is not 51
truly reflective of regional dynamics.    52
 Academics and policymakers   generally understand the Arctic to be an 53
exceptional ‘zone of cooperation’ largely insulated from international political dynamics 
over the last decade—even through the media alarmism over a potential “New Cold 
War” in the Arctic and the Crimea Crisis. The Arctic has a history of cooperative state 
behavior dating back decades. The idea of Arctic Exceptionalism began even before the 
Soviet Union collapsed. In a 1987 speech in Murmansk, Soviet Communist Party 
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Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev outlined a vision of a denuclearized, demilitarized 
High North that supported opening the region to joint scientific research, economic 
cooperation, and regional environmental protections.   Not only was the effort to keep 54
the Arctic peaceful initiated by the Soviet Union, but its successor Russia has continued 
to be a leading proponent. 
 Regardless of what some observers might see as assertive or aggressive moves, 
Russia has actually been part of an effort by all Arctic states to enshrine a norm of 
international cooperation.   It has publicly released policy papers and orders stating its 55
continued interest in keeping the Arctic peaceful and has committed to resolving issues 
within international law.   Arctic Exceptionalism is a multilateral phenomenon, the 56
lynchpins of which lie in a regional commitment to international law and institutions in 
the High North such as the Arctic Council and the United Nations Convention for the 
Law of the Sea. 
 The Arctic Council started in 1989 with a series of meetings of circumpolar 
ministers to discuss environmental issues, which eventually resulted in a coordinated 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. This initiative gave rise to the Arctic Council in 
1996, and the body has evolved from a forum on environmental issues to a treaty-
facilitating body that has led studies on various Arctic issues and facilitated the creation 
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of international agreements.   The Arctic Council has been the primary international 57
institution of the region, and cooperation within it has led to treaties ranging from search 
and rescue coordination to fishing moratoriums in newly accessible Arctic regions.   58
 The United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the 
maritime law that governs the region. UNCLOS is a treaty that codifies customary 
international maritime law, dealing with various issues including maritime borders and 
ensuring freedom of navigation. It set up an international maritime court and sets a 200 
nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for maritime states wherein states have 
sole extraction rights to resources such as petroleum. It also set up an arbitration panel, 
the International Seabed Authority, to which states can submit claims to waters outside 
their EEZs should they be able to scientifically prove that claimed sections of seabed 
are subsea extensions of their geographic landmasses.   UNCLOS builds a system for 59
the peaceful distribution of maritime resources, but some states have overlapping 
claims in different areas of the Arctic. Canada, Denmark, and Russia have submitted 
claims to the International Seabed Authority, but the poor mapping of the bathymetry of 
the Arctic Ocean has been a significant hurdle to the settling of claims.   Nonetheless, 60
Arctic states have all proclaimed their continued intent to operate within the bounds of 
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international law. 
 Russia has publicly released policy papers and orders stating its continued interest 
in keeping the Arctic peaceful and has committed to resolving issues within international 
law.   It has submitted maritime claims to the Lomonosov Ridge under the North Pole to 61
the International Seabed Authority, and despite competing claims from Canada and 
Denmark, it has committed to the peaceful settling of these disputes. Russia has also 
been a very active member of the Arctic Council involved in the passing of numerous 
treaties and agreements. It has also worked to improve bilateral relations with its Arctic 
neighbors. Russo-Norwegian relations are an excellent example. They settled a 
contentious sea border dispute in the Barents Sea in a deal particularly generous to 
Norway in 2010, and the two countries have run a joint Barents Sea fisheries 
management regime for decades.    62
 While Russia has been a leading proponent of Arctic Exceptionalism and 
maintaining cooperation and peace in the region, it must be noted that this policy 
derives from Russia’s own national interest. Indeed, Russia has proven that it will not 
necessarily cleave to international norms in the region when its interests are at stake. 
The Arctic Sunrise case is an excellent example of such an instance.  
 Arctic Exceptionalism is partially based in the United Nations Convention for the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—international law that has built the region’s norms. Russia 
has publicly committed to working within that framework, notably in a clear statement on 
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the topic in 2013.   While Russia has been a leading proponent of maintaining 63
cooperation and peace in the region, it must be noted that this policy derives from 
Russia’s own national interest. Indeed, russia has proven that it will not necessarily 
cleave to international norms in the region when its interests are at stake. For instance, 
a few months after Russia’s 2013 statement on its commitment to operating with 
UNCLOS, the Arctic Sunrise incident occurred.  
 The Dutch flagged Greenpeace ship Arctic Sunrise carried protesters who 
attempted to scale the Prirazlomnoya Rig in protest of Arctic energy extraction. Russian 
authorities seized the ship and detained 30 crew and activists at gunpoint and charged 
them with piracy and hooliganism. The Netherlands, an Arctic Council observer state, 
regarded the arrests and seizing of the ship as illegal and filed a case against Russia at 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea per UNCLOS. The tribunal ruled that 
Russia had illegally seized the ship in violation of the freedom of navigation provision of 
UNCLOS but was notably unwilling to accept UNCLOS arbitration mechanisms.   64
Remarkably and despite Russia’s commitment to the Convention, Russia refused to 
participate in the hearing and ignored the tribunal’s ruling in favor of the Netherlands. 
 This case is remarkable for two reasons. First, the case raised concerns about 
Russia’s consistent commitment to UNCLOS when energy extraction—a vital Russian 
national interest—is threatened. This case is an excellent example of the limits of Arctic 
Exceptionalism and illustrates how Russia’s support for regional cooperative regimes is 
based on its national interests—particularly those related to economic development per 
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its foreign policy objectives, and when those interests are threatened, Russia has 
proven itself willing to break with regional norms. Second, Russia broke with 
longstanding policy in deference to its energy interests in the North. The Prirazlomnoya 
Oil Rig was Russia’s flagship Arctic energy project and remains the only Arctic offshore 
rig, and intervening to defend this rig is indicative of the weight that Russian foreign 
policymakers place on energy interests in the region. This case can be taken as 
evidence that Russia’s support for Arctic Exceptionalism is based on its own national 
interest. President Vladimir Putin himself has all but said this outright when he stated, 
“I’m certain that the Arctic must be regarded as a space for open and equitable 
dialogue, based on the principles of universal and indivisible security, where there will 
be no place for geopolitical games by military blocs, backstage deals or struggle for 
spheres of influence” in an address to the Arctic council. He went on to say, “Russia will 
remain committed to the peaceful development of the region, provided its own national 
interests are observed and the interests of all other countries unconditionally 
respected.”    65
VI. “Disruptions” in Arctic Exceptionalism 
 While Exceptionalism had been the polar paradigm for decades, the Crimea Crisis 
and NATO’s corresponding sanctions on Russia raised the possibility that the Arctic 
would indeed succumb to a media-projected “New Cold War” for Arctic resources. While 
relations were indeed impacted in the time after the events, tension has largely 
dissipated and cooperative regimes have again taken primacy.  
 The Euromaidan protests in Ukraine were sparked by Ukrainian President 
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Yanukovich’s last-minute backing out of an EU association agreement in favor of an 
association with the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States. Protests against 
this move, police brutality, and corruption led to incensed citizens pouring into the 
streets and forcing Yanukovych to flee to safety in Russia. The fall of the Russia-friendly 
Yanukovych government reorientated Ukraine away from Russia’s orbit. Russia, worried 
about potential spillover from protests in its neighbors, seized and annexed Crimea. 
Seeing this annexation as illegal under international law and unacceptable to world 
order, the U.S. and a variety of Western nations cancelled several partnerships with 
Russia and slapped a series of sanctions on the country that first targeted specific 
individuals and then grew to target entire industries. The sanctions regime remains in 
place today, and fighting between Kiev and Kremlin-sponsored separatists continues in 
Eastern Ukraine.  
 Before the imposition of Western sanctions over Russia’s seizing of Crimea, 
Russian military activity had been increasing in the Arctic with new investments in 
Northern military capability. Following the Crimea Crisis however, Russia further 
increased military spending in the far north, reopening old Soviet installations or 
commissioning new bases, reorganizing its military operations, and launching massive 
war games in 2015 to showcase its regional strength.    66
  In December 2014, the Russian Arctic Joint Strategic Command was created. 
Shortly after, Russia released a new military doctrine in which it declared that it saw 
NATO expansion as its largest threat. Though NATO has little unified policy towards the 
Arctic, the polar regions were identified as one of three geopolitical arenas in which 
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Russia would bolster its strategic capabilities. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that 
“new challenges and threats to military security require the armed forces to further boost 
their military capabilities. Special attention must be paid to newly created strategic 
formations in the north.”   67
 The Arctic Joint Strategic Command was built out of the remnants of the Soviet 
North Fleet but includes ground and air forces to help cover all aspects of defending 
Russia’s northern boundary. Russia bolstered its regional ground forces by adding a 
second mechanized Arctic brigade and began training a commando unit designed to 
operate in the Arctic.    Additionally, the defense ministry was tasked with ensuring new 68
Russian weapons systems be designed with the intention of functioning in extreme cold 
temperatures. 
 To bolster aerial defense capabilities, nine S-400 Triumph surface-to-air missile 
systems were moved to the coast to cover missile defense. Additionally, the Russians 
are opening or reopening over a dozen airfields and almost as many air-defense radar 
stations. These air bases are being opened with the intent of creating the infrastructure 
to give modern bombers access to Arctic skies.   69
 Russia has also been working to renovate the remains of the Soviet North Fleet 
that serves as the base for the Arctic Joint Strategic Command. Investment has gone 
towards modernizing its fleet, and Russia has been particularly focused on building new 
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icebreakers and a new class of nuclear submarines. The old North Fleet was 
traditionally limited to operations west of Novaya Zemlya due to a lack of logistical and 
military support further east, and Russia has actively sought to remedy this situation by 
building over a dozen deepwater ports to gain full military access to the region.   70
 For five days in 2015, the Arctic Joint Strategic Command was fully tested. Over 
38,000 servicemen, over 50 ships and submarines, and over 100 aircraft participated in 
Arctic drills. The destroyer Admiral Levchenko was joined by anti-submarine warfare 
corvettes to simulate forcing nuclear submarines to perform an emergency surfacing 
and surrender. Patrol aircraft assisted in the mock enemy submarine search, and more 
planes participated in patrol flights to test air defense combat readiness along the coast. 
On the ground, mechanized units practiced “militant” elimination in harsh weather, and 
Arctic commando units were airlifted to remote locations. In the far east, missile units 
practiced launching tactical nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and helicopters practiced 
fighting ground forces and mine-laying.   71
 The expansive geographic scale was unusual, and Russia was testing its 
capabilities for limited ground forces engagement, anti-submarine warfare, strategic 
bomber runs, and ballistic missile launches—all activities that would be a major part of 
any confrontation with NATO. The focus on submarine warfare, bomber runs, and 
ballistic missile launches exercised Russia’s nuclear deterrent.   72
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 The early days of the Crimea Crisis brought other limited external political and 
conflict dynamics to the Arctic. The crisis has instilled distrust of Russia in its NATO 
Arctic neighbors and disrupted established security cooperation in the Arctic. Early after 
the crisis, the joint Northern Eagle naval exercises with Russia, the United States, and 
Norway were cancelled. Additionally, annual meetings between Arctic defense leaders 
were cancelled, and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable were held without Russian 
participation. A hazard-reduction workshop in Alaska for scientists and emergency 
management experts of the United States and Russia was cancelled after the US State 
Department withdrew funding over the Crimea Crisis. Similarly, the head of the Russian 
emergency service agency skipped an international emergency response meeting at the 
University of Alaska Fairbanks.   High level military cooperation has largely ceased 73
regionally in the wake of the Crimea Crisis and subsequent sanctions on Russia—the 
most notable impact of the Crimea Crisis.  
 Some Arctic Council meetings were also disturbed. Russia took a quiet line against 
the European Union gaining observer status on the international institution before the 
2015 ministerial meeting, though the European Union was unlikely to join given 
Canada’s opposition over the EU’s ban on seal products. Additionally, the United States 
and Canada boycotted Arctic Council meetings organized or hosted by Russia in the 
early days of the crisis.  
 Western sanctions over Russia’s annexation of Crimea and meddling in Eastern 
Ukraine targeted Russia’s Arctic energy development. Joint ventures between Russian 
and Western energy firms have been disrupted, impacting firms like Exxon-Mobil, ENI, 
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Statoil, Total, Halliburton, and Nord Atlantic Drilling.   The sanctions gradually targeted 74
Russian off-shore developments and then targeted the export of Western goods, 
services, and technology for the development of Russian Arctic energy projects. 
Additionally, financial sanctions restricted Russia’s access to capital for expensive Arctic 
megaprojects. Ongoing projects such as Exxon-Mobil and Rosneft’s joint exploration of 
the Kara Sea and Statoil-Rosneft work in the Barents Sea have been halted. This 
economic uncertainty has led to heightened risk for investment in the region, leading 
Blackstone to cease activities in Russia and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development to suspend investments in the High North.    75
 While the Crimea Crisis seems to have greatly disrupted regional cooperation and 
heightened potential conflict, such judgments are cursory and not truly reflective of the 
region. While the Crimea Crisis has disrupted some high-level military and economic 
cooperation, the Arctic remains remarkably stable and peaceful despite strong Russia-
NATO conflicts in other regions, and disrupted cooperation schemes have largely 
resumed in other areas such as coastal safety programs and scientific efforts. 
 Through the Crimea Crisis, Russia has continued to be a prominent voice for 
international dialogue and regional cooperation. In December 2016, Russia made very 
clear its position when Putin approved an executive order stating, “Russia will firmly 
oppose any and all attempts to bring elements of confrontation and military standoff in 
the Arctic, and to politicize international cooperation in the region on the whole.”   It has 76
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sought to improve bilateral relations with NATO Arctic states through joint development 
projects, has largely continued to support international institutions, and its politicians 
make repeated calls for dialogue and cooperation. Seeking international approval, 
Russia has maintained its commitment to the International Seabed Authority in 
acknowledging its claim to the contested Lomonosov Ridge over the North Pole, and it 
updated its claim in 2016.    77
 The Arctic Council has returned to normal operations as well. Cooperation in this 
institution was disrupted in the early days of the Crimea Crisis under the largely hostile 
Harper administration in Canada and an American State Department under Hillary 
Clinton, who took a hardline against Russia. Canada and the United States boycotted 
multiple ministerial meetings, but Russia remained committed to the Council and affairs 
returned to normal within a year. The Harper administration changed its combative tone 
towards Russia in the Arctic in its last days, and the Trudeau administration has 
maintained a cooperative attitude with Russia in the region.   Simultaneously, the 78
United States boycotts of Russian meetings did not last long. By the fall of 2014, the 
United States declared a conciliatory tone with Russia in the region, and the US Special 
Representative to the Arctic, Admiral Robert J. Papp, visited Moscow to discuss 
American chairmanship of the Arctic Council in the winter of 2015.   Russia maintained 79
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calls for the United States and Canada to engage in the Council, and by the summer of 
2015, productive Arctic Council meetings were held without disruption.   Indeed, the 80
Arctic Council has remained remarkably productive throughout the post-Crimea 
downturn in NATO-Russian relations with continued meetings and uninterrupted 
multilateral policy-creation.  
 At the conference, “International Cooperation in the Arctic: New Challenges and 
Vectors of Development,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin noted the 
Arctic Council’s success. He stated, “the Arctic is one of the few areas where 
international cooperation not only hasn't been suspended but continues apace. We had 
to curtail cooperation with western countries even in space, which is something sacred, 
but concerning the Arctic things are just the opposite.” In addition, he noted that none of 
the 80 cooperative projects implemented at the Arctic Council had been suspended 
since the imposition of Western sanctions over Crimea.    81
 In addition to efforts to maintain the Arctic Council, Russia has made substantial 
efforts to bolster bilateral relations with its Arctic neighbors. In summer 2016, Russia’s 
deputy foreign minister and the Icelandic president and foreign minister met to discuss 
the decline in bilateral relations, and both sides expressed mutual interest in deepening 
cooperative efforts in the region and bolstering trade ties despite international 
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sanctions.   Canada and Russia held cautious meetings on repairing ties in the Arctic 82
despite disagreements in other arenas, and the two began scientific cooperative efforts 
again as Russian politicians called on Canada to resume cooperation.   Russia and 83
Norway have retained a cooperative relationship throughout the Crimea Crisis despite 
the Norway’s imposition of sanctions, and the countries have organized seismic data 
sharing schemes and joint environmental protections. In winter 2017, Norwegian foreign 
minister Borge Brende noted successful joint efforts in fisheries management, nuclear 
safety, and security and environmental protection despite disagreements. A month later, 
Brende said “the challenges hindering cooperation between Russia, Europe and NATO 
have not affected the Arctic yet, which is good. Successful cooperation between Russia 
and Norway in the North continues.”   In regards to the United States, dialogue in the 84
Arctic resumed under Secretary of State John Kerry in the summer of 2015, and the two 
announced a fishing accord to protect young Arctic fisheries. In response, WWF 
spokesman Clive Tesar stated “some people call this Arctic Exceptionalism. We have 
our disagreements elsewhere, but in the Arctic, we have to cooperate.”   85
 From this political level, Arctic Exceptionalism does remain robust. While states, 
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especially those seeking to present a strong stance over Ukraine and Russia to 
domestic audiences, may not espouse these cooperative achievements at home, 
cooperation outside of the economic and security spheres remain robust in the form of 
search-and-rescue cooperation, environmental protection, etc. That said, external 
observers often seize on Russian military modernization and increase in capability in 
the region as evidence of belligerent militarization and an omen of a “New Cold War.” 
Before the Crimea Crisis, Russian military investment was seen as legitimate to monitor 
and secure its opening Northern border and maintain access to the North; however, 
such acts have become increasingly interpreted as threatening. This has been a result 
of the rising distrust of Russian actions around the world.  
 Indeed, with the exception of the 2015 war games, Russian military engagement in 
the region is not particularly targeted at other Arctic states, and even the 
aforementioned war games, seen as a particularly belligerent act by observers 
unfamiliar with regional dynamics, can hardly be described as aggressive. They were 
launched in the wake of NATO member Norway’s own unannounced Crimea-inspired 
war games held near the Russian border just a few weeks before. Bombastic rhetoric 
and gestures have largely been for the benefit of Russian domestic audiences rather 
than international parties. For instance, the 2007 placement of the Russian flag on the 
Arctic seabed was condemned internationally, but experts and policymakers recognized 
it as an attempt to boost the political party United Russia's election chances at home 
given the importance of the Arctic to the Russian people.    86
 While military spending in the Arctic is admittedly high—perhaps exceeding peak 
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Soviet spending—it is important to acknowledge a few factors to place this spending 
within the proper context.   One major factor is the drastic decline in northern military 87
spending following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Until recently, the old Soviet North 
Fleet was decaying for lack of funding, and serious investments have been necessary to 
not just halt the deterioration of Russian military capability in the North but to begin to 
modernize it as well. Before Russia launched the Arctic Joint Strategic Command, the 
Russian Arctic fleet was in poor shape. It consisted of around forty surface vessels, 
approximately 15 of which were unusable, and only twelve of its forty submarines were 
usable.   In addition to modernizing the fleet, spending has been focused on reopening 88
Soviet bases that had been closed for decades; thus, Russian spending in the North 
can be seen as an attempt to return to a realistic presence in the Arctic given the 
region’s rising importance rather than belligerent militarization.  
 It can also be seen as a rational response to the Arctic’s changes. Climate change 
has made the region more accessible, and though a cross-Arctic invasion is still 
infeasible, the increase in civilian activity in the region reflects a need for heightened 
military presence. Economic activity in the Russian Arctic is higher than elsewhere in 
the High North given that Russia contains most of the region’s resources and 
population, so it should not be unreasonable that military spending is higher there than 
in other states. Additionally, heightened Russian military presence comes as the Arctic 
begins to emerge as a crucial economic interest; it makes sense that Russia is 
spending more to protect increasingly important energy assets in the region.  
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 Outside of energy, there are a variety of Russian economic interests in the far 
north. A staggering $1.5 to $2 trillion in mineral wealth is estimated to be opening to 
development with the region’s warming.   Additionally, Russia seeks to ensure the 89
security and functionality of the emerging Northern Sea Route, a shortcut between 
Europe and Asia that might one day rival the Suez Canal during summer periods. 
Significantly shorter than conventional maritime trade routes between Asia and Europe, 
the route could produce immense transport cost savings, and China alone could save 
between $60 and $120 billion annually, and Russia could potentially charge substantial 
fees for keeping the route open with its icebreaker fleet.   Military spending is not only 90
designed to protect Russian economic interests, but also to develop the region. The 
reopening of old Soviet bases and commissioning of new ones can be seen as a 
project-based development effort to build infrastructure to connect what will become an 
important economic region to the Russian heartland, not only for its oil interests but also 
for the potential of the Northern Sea Route and mineral wealth. New and reopened 
army bases connect the region to rail and road transportation networks. New and 
reopened air bases allow modern aircraft access to the North, but they are also 
essential in setting up search-and-rescue operations necessary for heavy traffic along 
the Northern Sea Route. New and reopened navy installations and deepwater ports 
grant the Arctic Joint Strategic Command the ability to the patrol the entire Arctic, and 
they also serve as important refueling stops and refuges for oil tankers and cargo ships 
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plying the dangerous seas of the Northern Sea Route.  
 The cancellation of high-level Arctic military cooperation—the cancellation of the 
Northern Eagle naval drills and the annual meetings of Arctic national defense chiefs—
can be seen as evidence for rising Arctic conflict, but this argument does not 
acknowledge the other ways that cooperation has continued. While it is acknowledged 
that high-level military contacts in the Arctic have been interrupted with the exception of 
joint drills between Norway and Russia in 2016, security cooperation has continued at a 
lower level. In 2015, regional coast guards created the Arctic Coast Guard Forum to 
foster secure and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic.   Such 91
cooperation and joint efforts illustrate continued military cooperation, but at a less 
prominent level reflective of the political need of NATO states to look strong in 
opposition to Russia in regards to Ukraine and Syria.   92
VII. Impact of Sanctions and the Collapse in Oil Prices 
 As I argue that Russia pursues a cooperative agenda in the North so as to gain 
access to Western technology and expertise, I must address the impact of sanctions 
and the collapse of oil prices on the High North. Western nations imposed economic 
sanctions on Russia over its annexation of Crimea to increase their leverage in 
negotiations over Ukraine. Sanctions were not designed to restrict the normal flow of 
energy resources from Russia but to curtail long-term development. All of Russia’s 
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circumpolar neighbors and Western nations with firms operating in the North 
acknowledge the region’s importance to Russia, and as such, they specifically target 
Arctic energy technology transfers and cooperation. Indeed, sanctions affect 68 percent 
 of imported equipment.   93
 Major energy companies operating in joint projects with state-owned Russian 
counterparts have been largely frozen out of the Arctic. For example, ExxonMobil froze 
cooperation with Rosneft in the Kara Sea; Rosneft has been forced to suspend offshore 
Arctic activities until at least 2018 due to a lack of available Western technology; and 
Total suspended cooperation with Lukoil on the Bazhenov formation.   Given its energy 94
companies’ dependence on Western capital, technology, expertise, and equipment, 
Russia has attempted to foster domestic development of energy technology and to 
acquire necessary equipment, technology, and capital from other sources. Russia has 
been successful in acquiring capital from Asian states like China and Japan for its Arctic 
energy developments. Arctic energy arriving by the Northern Sea Route could serve 
Asian markets and help East Asian states to diversify their energy sources and reduce 
dependence on volatile regions such as the Middle East.   95
  While Russia has been successful in harnessing Asian capital, East Asian 
countries have not been a suitable source of technology to replace Western firms. East 
Asian energy companies do not have the same experience in Northern areas as many 
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Western nations’ companies operating in the north, and constituent parts of equipment 
used by East Asian energy companies may also originate in the West.   The lack of 96
access to needed technologies has led Russia to attempt to foster domestic 
development of energy technologies. In the beginning of 2015, the Russian Ministry of 
Industry and Trade announced an import substitution plan for the oil sector and granted 
low interest long-term loans for import-substituting projects. Despite these measures, 
Russia’s attempts have not been successful.   97
 While one may expect the primary disruption in the Arctic to lead to heightened 
tensions, I would argue that economic sanctions actually highlight the dependency of 
Russian firms on Western technologies to Russian policymakers. It is crucial and timely 
to the Russian economy to bring Arctic energy sources online, so Russia has no choice 
but to attempt to reduce regional tensions so as to get sanctions lifted. A 
counterargument to this point would be that the collapse of oil prices has made 
development of the Arctic uneconomical, meaning that Russia’s incentive to keep the 
region peaceful is decreased.  
 The collapse in oil prices has indeed disrupted Arctic energy developments. The 
price collapse has decreased the profitability of extracting energy, leading energy 
companies to curtail investment and projects in more marginal areas. The operating 
costs and investment needed to operate in the harsh Arctic environment mean that the 
price of oil has to remain high so as to maintain the profitability of investment, and these 
issues with economic viability have had a particularly strong impact on offshore projects. 
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Eni’s hope at developing a Barents Sea field was disrupted by the collapse in oil prices, 
and industry analysts projected that it needed an oil price of $95 per barrel in order for 
the development to be economical.   Operating at lower costs, Statoil’s Johan Castberg 98
project in the Arctic has a break-even point of $60 per barrel, but this remains 
uneconomical as of spring 2017.   Onshore Arctic developments have continued 99
however. For instance, Russian state-owned firms have maintained development in the 
Yamal Peninsula. The CEO of Novatek, a privately owned Russian energy company 
working on a major liquid natural gas plant, maintained that the plant will be profitable 
even at a marker price of $30 per barrel according to Russian state media.   While that 100
claim, purported in state media, may or may not be accurate, Russian energy firms 
continue production onshore in the Arctic. Even after oil prices collapsed in 2014, 
Russian companies actually boosted production in 2015 with the help of Arctic 
sources.   101
 Onshore sources and existing fields largely continue to be profitable for Russian 
energy firms, and existing equipment allows Russia to maintain current production 
levels. That said, Russian firms are unable to replace Western technology and 
equipment with domestic versions due to sanctions, and they have been forced to 
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curtail planned investments. These issues may lead to an eventual fall in production and 
thus exports and tax revenue for the state—a potentially major long-term problem for 
Russia.  
 Russia is dependent on Western technology for its Arctic development, and Russia 
needs Arctic resources for long-term tax revenues and economic growth, leading to its 
cooperative regional policy. While one could argue that Russia has less of an incentive 
to keep the region peaceful as the High North is less profitable due to low energy prices, 
this argument would be shortsighted as it ignores long-term goals. Sanctions have 
impacted the long-term ability of energy companies to profitably exploit polar resources, 
disrupting offshore Arctic projects and going so far as to complicate developments in 
even sub-Arctic areas. This challenge to Russia’s long-term goals comes as Russian 
policymakers see the pain that arises from even short-term disruptions to its energy 
sector. The combination of sanctions and the collapse in oil prices have already had a 
devastating impact on the Russian economy. Russia’s Economic Expert Group estimate 
that losses to the Russian energy industry from sanctions amount to $170 billion and 
$400 billion from the collapse in oil prices, and these losses have played havoc with 
Russian state finances.    102
 As stated earlier, this short-term pain and the dire prospect of long-term challenges 
of developing Arctic resources and maintaining production levels with a dwindling supply 
of Western parts provides a powerful incentive for Russian policymakers to seek the 
removal of sanctions. As withdrawal from Crimea is politically impossible for Russia’s 
leadership, Russia has somewhat limited options to pressure the West to lift sanctions. 
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An obvious solution for Russian policymakers is to focus on deescalating tensions in the 
Arctic. Promoting Arctic Exceptionalism and seeking to build partnerships in the region 
helps to reduce regional tension and serves to improve chances of region-specific 
sanctions being reduced or lifted. An uncooperative regional policy would certainly be 
counterproductive to this effort. In this strain, expert Michael Byers said, “the Russians 
are desperate to see sanctions lifted. In that context, they’re very eager to improve 
relations in any domain.”   Russia has been playing a long game in the Arctic as its 103
development is a long-term goal. Its strategy is based on an assumption that economic 
sanctions will eventually be lifted, and cooperative policy is designed to encourage the 
easing of sanctions sooner rather than later.  
VIII. Foreign Policy Perspective and Future Prospects 
 As I argue in the literature review, Russian foreign policy is driven by a pursuit of 
“great power status,” or Derzhavnost, pursued through the subgoals of prestige-
building, an effort often associated with assertive behavior or military strength, and 
promoting economic development. Those subgoals may clash as is evidenced by 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and continued involvement in Eastern Ukraine despite 
economic sanctions as an assertion of prestige-building efforts over a desire for 
economic development. In the Arctic, I argue that economic interests are the primary 
drivers of Russian policymaking. 
 This assertion is based on the fact that Russia is already the leading Arctic nation, 
a regional superpower. Most polar oil and gas is in Russian territory, and 80 percent of 
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Russia’s known gas reserves are in the Arctic.   It is more economically active in the 104
region than other countries. As much as 20 percent of Russia’s GDP, 11 percent of 
gross national income, and 22 percent of total Russian exports originate from Arctic 
activity.   Russia also has largest icebreaker fleet in the world with its fleet growing past 105
40 while the United States currently two nonfunctioning icebreakers.   Russia 106
composes around half of the Arctic’s total landmass, and approximately half of the Arctic 
is comprised of its citizens.   While its neighbors on the Arctic Ocean are members of 107
NATO, there is no cohesive alliance policy towards the North. NATO is distracted by 
urgent issues in a number of arenas and is thus reluctant to engage fully in the Arctic.   108
 Given that Russia is already the strongest polar state, it has met its prestige-
seeking goal on a regional basis. It is greater than its European and North American 
neighbors in the region by most measures, and its rights and interests are respected 
there.   As Russia is clearly well respected and recognized for its polar might, it needs 109
not seek further status or prestige, allowing Russian foreign policy to be dominated by 
its other subgoal—economic development. Indeed, Russian cooperative policy is led by 
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a crucial need to develop the Arctic and reliance on cooperation with Western actors to 
do so. This strategy rests on the assumption by policymakers that the United States and 
the European Union will eventually lift sanctions, and Russia may get its wishes sooner 
rather than later.  
 The advent of the Trump Administration may result in a successful Russian gamble 
in the North. Both the Trump Campaign and the Administration have been remarkably 
friendly towards Russia, and this could be a significant boon for Russia should it result 
in an easing of Western sanctions. The new US administration has been subjected to 
severe scrutiny and been plagued scandal in regards to its relations with Russia since 
before President Trump’s election. Trump associates have been reported to have had 
close contacts with Russian officials, and the Republican party softened its language on 
Russia in its platform at the behest of the Trump administration. The confirmation of Rex 
Tillerson as Secretary of State is particularly relevant in relation to the Arctic. The former 
ExxonMobil CEO made extensive efforts to enter the Arctic energy market while working 
for his company. Under Tillerson’s leadership, ExxonMobil invested billions of dollars 
into a joint project to explore the Kara Sea with Rosneft, a Russian state-owned energy 
corporation, and Putin awarded him Russia’s highest civilian honor for his company’s 
work.   110
 While there is now a more Russia-friendly administration in the White House, 
political furor and investigations into Russia’s role in the 2016 American presidential 
election has raised the political cost of easing sanctions for the Trump Administration. In 
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this light, it is unlikely that the Trump Administration will attempt to lift full sanctions until 
concerns and investigations over contacts with Russia ease. While the short-term 
prospects for the removal of Arctic sanctions are dim, there is still a relatively friendly 
American administration, and Russian policymakers likely recognize the higher chances 
of having sanctions lifted under President Trump and may make extra efforts promote 
cooperation in the High North. The institution by which Arctic Exceptionalism is 
nominally affirmed—the Arctic Council, a body with a traditional core focus on 
environmental issues—may change under President Trump given his skepticism of 
climate change. Instead, there may be an increase in reliance on bilateral relations for 
regional policymaking or on multilateral efforts with “the Arctic Five,” a group of nations 
with territory bordering the Arctic Ocean that have met as a group in the past. 
IX. Conclusion  
 Excitement around the opportunities presented by a melting Arctic and 
subsequent ominous warnings of a “New Cold War” over those resources has drawn 
policymaker eyes to the High North. This conflict has failed to manifest despite a 
collapse in relations between Russia and its NATO Arctic neighbors in southern arenas 
such as Ukraine and Syria. In this thesis, I have explored the mechanism by which such 
a conflict is prevented and Arctic Exceptionalism is reinforced. I have argued that the 
unusually cooperative behavior of Russia in the Arctic is driven primarily by its long-term 
economic interests in the region. Russia’s economy is dependent on energy exports, 
and it needs Arctic resources to maintain its petroleum and gas output in the future; 
however, Russia has neither the technology, expertise, nor equipment necessary for 
polar resource extraction and must thus rely on Western energy corporations. This 
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dependency has led to Russia’s remarkably cooperative policy and support for 
depoliticizing the High North as a long-term economic development strategy.  
 Understanding why Russia is cooperating in the Arctic while entering conflict in 
other arenas can be of great importance to policymakers and to international relations 
scholars. A robust and nuanced understanding of Russian foreign policy can be useful 
to policymakers in that it can provide predictive insights into Russian policy behavior. An 
understanding of Russian policy priorities and the factors encouraging Russian 
cooperative behavior in the Arctic can also be helpful in both alleviating tensions in other 
global arenas as well as in cementing a norm of peaceful cooperation in the High North. 
Additionally, an understanding of the mechanisms that help to insulate the Arctic from 
global political dynamics could be used by policymakers and diplomats to employ more 
robust conflict prevention mechanisms in other areas of the world. 
 While this thesis has provided insight into Russian foreign policymaking and the 
country’s prioritization of long-term national interests in the region, I have only explored 
one side of this issue. Further avenues for research include an examination of the 
reasons for which Western nations have also sought to support Arctic Exceptionalism. 
Given that Russia is the region’s leading state and that pressure on Russia in the Arctic 
could provide leverage to adversaries, further research should explore why NATO has 
so little presence in the region and why the US is relatively disengaged in the High 
North. A thorough understanding of the mechanisms that promote Arctic Exceptionalism 
on both the Russian and the NATO sides may be helpful in developing methods to 
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